Saturday, September 26, 2009

The Plot Against America

Review by DEXTER FILKINS

Published: August 6, 2006

Reprinted from http://islamic-danger.blogspot.com/2007/03/plot-against-america-review-by-dexter.html?zx=a44486c44649c66


When Mohamed Atta and his four Saudi confederates commandeered a Boeing 767 and steered it into the north tower of the World Trade Center, they began a story that still consumes us nearly five years on, and one that seems, on bad days, to promise war without end.



Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Osama bin Laden



Frances M. Roberts/The New York Times
F.B.I. counterterrorism expert John O’Neill, who died in the Sept. 11 attacks.

But the events of Sept. 11, 2001, were in many ways less the start of a tale than the end of one, or at least the climax of one, begun many years before in many different precincts: in the middle-class suburbs of Cairo, in the mosques of Hamburg, in Jidda, in Islamabad, in the quiet university town of Greeley, Colo.

In its simplest terms, this is the story of how a small group of men, with a frightening mix of delusion and calculation, rose from a tormented civilization to mount a catastrophic assault on the world’s mightiest power, and how another group of men and women, convinced that such an attack was on the way, tried desperately to stop it.

What a story it is. And what a riveting tale Lawrence Wright fashions in this marvelous book. “The Looming Tower*” is not just a detailed, heart-stopping account of the events leading up to 9/11, written with style and verve, and carried along by villains and heroes that only a crime novelist could dream up. It’s an education, too — though you’d never know it — a thoughtful examination of the world that produced the men who brought us 9/11, and of their progeny who bedevil us today. The portrait of John O’Neill, the driven, demon-ridden F.B.I. agent who worked so frantically to stop Osama bin Laden, only to perish in the attack on the World Trade Center, is worth the price of the book alone. “The Looming Tower” is a thriller.

And it’s a tragedy, too.

In the nearly five years since the attacks, we’ve heard oceans of commentary on the whys and how-comes and what-it-means and what’s nexts. Wright, a staff writer for The New Yorker — where portions of this book have appeared — has put his boots on the ground in the hard places, conducted the interviews and done the sleuthing. Others talked, he listened. And so he has unearthed an astonishing amount of detail about Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Muhammad Omar and all the rest of them. They come alive.

Who knew, for instance, that bin Laden, far from being a warrior-stoic fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, was actually a pathetic stick-in-the-mud who would fall ill before battle? That the combat-hardened Afghans, so tired of bin Laden’s behavior, declared him and his Arab associates “useless”? Or that he was a permissive father and indulgent husband? Or that he is only six feet tall?

More important, who knew — I sure didn’t — that bin Laden had left behind such a long trail of words? Wright has found them in books, on film, in audio recordings, in people’s notebooks and memories. This has allowed him to draw an in-depth portrait of bin Laden, and to chart his evolution from a self-conscious step-child growing up in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to the visionary cave-dwelling madman who mimics the Holy Prophet in his most humdrum daily habits.

Wright takes the title of his book from the fourth sura of the Koran, which bin Laden repeated three times in a speech videotaped just as the hijackers were preparing to fly. The video was found later, on a computer in Hamburg.

“Wherever you are, death will find you, Even in the looming tower.”

There is poetry, too. Here is a particularly chilling bit, found on another videotape, which bin Laden had read aloud at the wedding of his 17-year-old son, Mohammed. The celebration took place not long after a pair of Qaeda suicide bombers, riding in a tiny boat filled with explosives, nearly sank the billion-dollar guided missile destroyer Cole. At least with regard to his abilities as an author, bin Laden was unusually modest: he let someone else write the words. “I am not, as most of our brothers know, a warrior of the word,” he said.
A destroyer, even the brave might fear,
She inspires horror in the harbor and the open sea,
She goes into the waves flanked by arrogance, haughtiness and fake might,
To her doom she progresses slowly, clothed in a huge illusion,
Awaiting her is a dinghy, bobbing in the waves.

“The Looming Tower” is full of such surprising detail. Al Qaeda’s leaders had all but shelved the 9/11 plot when they realized they lacked foot soldiers who could pass convincingly as westernized Muslims in the United States. At just the right moment Atta appeared in Afghanistan, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ziad al-Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehhi, all Western-educated transplants, offering themselves up for slaughter. The game was on.

Just as dramatic as the portraits of bin Laden and Zawahiri is Wright’s account of the roots of Islamic militancy — the intellectual, spiritual and material world from which the plotters came. Wright draws a fascinating picture of Sayyid Qutb, the font of modern Islamic fundamentalism, a frail, middle-aged writer who found himself, as a visitor to the United States and a student at Colorado State College of Education in Greeley in the 1940’s, overwhelmed by the unbridled splendor and godlessness of modern America. And by the sex: like so many others who followed him, Qutb seemed simultaneously drawn to and repelled by American women, so free and unselfconscious in their sexuality. The result is a kind of delirium:
“A girl looks at you, appearing as if she were an enchanting nymph or an escaped mermaid,” Qutb wrote, “but as she approaches, you sense only the screaming instinct inside her, and you can smell her burning body, not the scent of perfume, but flesh, only flesh. Tasty flesh, truly, but flesh nonetheless.”

It wasn’t much later that Qutb began writing elaborate rationalizations for killing non-Muslims and waging war against the West. Years later, Atta expressed a similar mix of obsession and disgust for women. Indeed, anyone who has spent time in the Middle East will recognize such tortured emotions.

WRIGHT shows, correctly, that at the root of Islamic militancy — its anger, its antimodernity, its justifications for murder — lies a feeling of intense humiliation. Islam plays a role in this, with its straitjacketed and all-encompassing worldview. But whether the militant hails from a middle-class family or an impoverished one, is intensely religious or a “theological amateur,” as Wright calls bin Laden and his cohort, he springs almost invariably from an ossified society with an autocratic government that is unable to provide any reason to believe in the future. Islam offers dignity, even in — especially in — death. Living in the West, Atta and the others felt these things more acutely, not less. As Wright notes:

“Their motivations varied, but they had in common a belief that Islam — pure and primitive, unmitigated by modernity and uncompromised by politics — would cure the wounds that socialism or Arab nationalism had failed to heal. They were angry but powerless in their own countries. They did not see themselves as terrorists but as revolutionaries who, like all such men throughout history, had been pushed into action by the simple human need for justice. Some had experienced brutal repression; some were simply drawn to bloody chaos. From the beginning of Al Qaeda, there were reformers and there were nihilists. The dynamic between them was irreconcilable and self-destructive, but events were moving so quickly that it was almost impossible to tell the philosophers from the sociopaths. They were glued together by the charismatic personality of Osama bin Laden, which contained both strands, idealism and nihilism, in a potent mix.”

In John O’Neill, bin Laden almost met his match. The supervisor of the F.B.I.’s New York office and of the team assigned to track Al Qaeda in the United States, O’Neill felt, as strongly as anyone in the government, that Al Qaeda was coming to America. He was a relentless investigator, a volcanic personality and sometimes his own worst enemy. In the end he broke himself on a government bureaucracy that could not — and would not — move as quickly as he did. O’Neill and others like him were in a race with Al Qaeda, and although we know how the race ended, it’s astonishing — and heartbreaking — to learn how close it was.

Some of the F.B.I.’s field agents, as we now know, had premonitions of what was coming. When the supervisor of the Minneapolis field office was admonished, in August 2001, for expressing fears that an Islamic radical attending flight school might be planning a suicide attack, he shot back defiantly that he was “trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center.” Amazing.

The most gut-wrenching scenes are the ones that show F.B.I. agents trying, as 9/11 approached, to pry information from their rivals inside the United States government. The C.I.A., Wright says, knew that high-level Qaeda operatives had held a meeting in Malaysia in January 2000, and, later, that two of them had entered the United States. Both men turned out to be part of the team that hijacked the planes on Sept. 11. The C.I.A. failed to inform agencies like the F.B.I. — which might have been able to locate the men and break up the plot — until late in the summer of 2001.

The fateful struggle between the C.I.A. and F.B.I. in the months leading up to the attacks has been outlined before, but never in such detail. At meetings, C.I.A. analysts dangled photos of two of the eventual hijackers in front of F.B.I. agents, but wouldn’t tell them who they were. The F.B.I. agents could sense that the C.I.A. possessed crucial pieces of evidence about Islamic radicals they were investigating, but couldn’t tell what they were. The tension came to a head at a meeting in New York on June 11, exactly three months before the catastrophe, which ended with F.B.I. and C.I.A. agents shouting at each other across the room.
In one of the most remarkable scenes in the book, Ali Soufan, an F.B.I. agent assigned to Al Qaeda, was taken aside on Sept. 12 and finally shown the names and photos of the men the C.I.A. had known for more than a year and a half were in America. The planes had already struck. Soufan ran to the bathroom and retched.

Great stuff. I just wish Wright had given us something, even a chapter, on the hijackings themselves; as it is, he takes us right up to the moment, and then straight to the burning towers. Perhaps he felt that ground was too well-trodden. My other complaint is more substantive. Through the enormous amount of legwork he has done, tracking down people who worked with bin Laden and Zawahiri over the years, Wright has drawn up verbatim reconstructions of entire conversations, some of which took place more than a decade ago. Many of these conversations are riveting. Still, in some cases, it’s hard to believe that memories are that good.
“The Looming Tower” ends near the Pakistani border, where Zawahiri, or someone who looked like him, rode through a village on horseback and then disappeared into the mountains. It’s not a definitive ending; there is no closure. And that’s the point. For as amazing as the story of Al Qaeda and the road to 9/11 is, it’s not over yet.


Dexter Filkins is a Baghdad correspondent for The Times.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/books/review/06filkins.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5090&en=0e30be2935673b53&ex=1312516800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rsspagewanted=1&ei=5090&en=0e30be2935673b53&ex=1312516800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rssFirst Chapter: ‘The Looming Tower’ (August 6, 2006)


_________________________________________


*THE LOOMING TOWER
Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. By Lawrence Wright.
Illustrated. 469 pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $27.95.

Friday, September 18, 2009

Al Qaida threatens ugly actions in Germany after elections

translated from LA VANGUARDIA.es - Internacional: Al Qaeda amenaza con atentar en Alemania tras las elecciones

Berlin. German television broadcasts a video of Islamist Bekkay Harrach demanding the withdrawal of German troops in Afghanistan [or face the consequences]

18/09/2009 updated 18: 38 pm Berlin International. (EFE).-

The terrorist organization Al Qaida threatens harmful actions in Germany after the 27 September elections if the government resulting from the elections does not call for the withdrawal of the German troops from Afghanistan.

According to a video accessed by the major German television network (ARD), the organization threatens Germany with a "bitter awakening" if the new Government, after the election, does not put an end to the German mission in Afghanistan.

The network announced that the person who made the threats on behalf of Al-Qaeda is Bekkay Harrach, Germano-Moroccan Islamist sought in Germany for supposed terrorist activity. "If the people decide by their choice of government a continuation of the war, they will have sentenced themselves to what will befall them."

"The general elections are the only opportunity to the people to shape the policy of the country," says Harrach in the video. The alleged terrorist also adds that "When the last German soldier leaves Afghanistan, the last mujahaddeen will leave Germany".

Harrach repeatedly appeared last year on a propaganda video for Al-Qaida, and in this last video, according to ARD, he urges resident Muslims in Germany to stay "away from public places" two weeks after the elections.

The German Federal Prosecutor's Office speculates that Harrach was recruited into the terrorist organisation by the Turkish Islamist Ömer Ö, which is currently being investigated in Koblenz (South Germany) for their alleged membership in Al Qaeda.

Translated from Al Qaeda amenaza con atentar en Alemania tras las elecciones, La Vanguardia.es

Translation of original webpage by Bing.com, edited by Leslie White

Sunday, September 6, 2009

Why Al Qaeda Maghreb Will Continue to Strike


The North Africa Journal : It's been a busy period for Al Qaeda Maghreb (AQMI). Its latest [published in April, 2009] targets have been European tourists and two Canadian diplomats still missing, despite the release of their driver. These latest strikes occurred at the eve of regional summit on security and peace in the Sahel region.

And so part of the motivations behind these strikes is to send a message to those who are combating that AQMI can strike any time, anywhere in the region. The latest from the Malian capital Bamako was that the summit has been postponed since unnamed leaders of the represented countries (Mali, Algeria, Niger, Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad) had scheduling conflicts. The reality is that such summit could not have happened after such a coup from Al Qaeda.

It is unsure how the abduction of the diplomats occurred. A consensus has emerged that the two men and their driver were first kidnapped by Touareg rebels, who traded them to AQMI. The two Canadian diplomats and the four European tourists were kidnapped in a zone located between the border of Mali and Niger, on the Niger side of the border. An announcement via Al Jazeera TV was made by a spokesperson called Salah Abu Mohammed. The Canadians Robert Fowler, Louis Gay and their Nigerian driver Soumana Moukaila, were actually seen in mid-December 2008 in Western Niamey, Niger’s capital. On December 14, 2008 they went on a private visit to a gold mine in Samira, operated by a Canadian mining company. As for the European tourists, they were officially kidnapped on January 22, 2009 also along the Mali-Niger border.

In reviewing some of the available details, it is worth noting that it is the first time AQMI or a terror organization manages such a daring operation on the Niger territory. Niger is clearly becoming a hotbed of illegal activity. It is also clear that Al Qaeda was seeking to make itself known and acknowledged as the heads of Sahel based governments were preparing to meet to discuss regional security. And while officials in Mali, the summit host country, claim that scheduling conflicts arose, AQMI’s latest strikes are likely the reasons behind the postponement of the conference. The attention of western governments, who also had a stake in participating in the summit, focused on the emerging crisis with their citizens and diplomats in the hands of Al Qaeda, an had little appetite for a forum.

This is not the first time Al Qaeda strikes in the Sahara. The latest such kidnappings happened last year when AQMI militants kidnapped two Austrian tourists in southern Tunisia desert. AQMI managed to elude the Tunisian authorities and escaped to Mali by traveling through the treacherous Algerian desert. After several months of intermittent talks, the Austrian government gave in to the demands of the kidnapers and ended up paying a ransom to free its nationals.

Germany also followed a similar move to free other hostages, a situation that has been a source of contention and displeasure in the region’s capitals, including Algiers. These countries argue that paying ransom money is equivalent to funding terrorism in affected regions. Algeria’s highest ranking officer in the ministry of foreign affairs in charge of Maghreb and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel is one of the top officials that made statements linking ransom payments to terror financing, while acknowledging the difficulty in controlling or monitoring the vast Sahel region as challenging. With an uncontrolled and vast territory, with growing money from ransoms and an abundance of weapons in the region’s black markets, AQMI is looking to benefit from such environment to establish a strong base from which it can manage its operations up north. The distracting Touareg conflict affecting the Sahara is creating another opportunity for AQMI to benefit from the confusion.

Unless there is a more cohesive regional strategy, involving with the participation of Western governments on issues around kidnapping and ransoms, AQMI will continue to operate in the region unchallenged. The incentives to build a base in the Sahel are more real than elsewhere. In addition to the expected continuation of their kidnapping strategy as a source of funding, coupled with the availability of weapons in that part of Africa, AQMI’s northern presence has been substantially eroded by sustained enforcement and military operations in the populated urban centers and rural areas. As Algeria, Morocco and other countries continue to crack down on insurgents, so it seems logical that the theater of operations would move in scarcely populated areas and in the vast desert. Until a cohesive approach is put in place, strengthened with real resources, technology and man power, AQMI will continue to execute on its plans to terrorize the region.

17 April, 2009

http://www.north-africa.com/social_polics/security_politics/2aprilnine19.html

Thursday, July 9, 2009

American Allies - the ethnic or religious minorities under oppression

Singer-activist Ferhat Mehenni’s campaign for liberal self-government.
Posted Mon, 06/22/2009 - 21:35 by Jugurten
Democracy in Algeria
from http://www.kabylia.info/

On the margins of the Arab world, the United States has some little noticed allies. These are ethnic or religious minorities who have never accepted the inevitability of strongman rule. Some of them have fallen on hard times-the Maronite Christians of Lebanon are scattered and defeated for now; the Copts, in Egypt, have been lying low for decades-but others see their fortunes rising. The Kurds of northern Iraq flourished under the protection of American jets in the last years of Saddam Hussein and are throwing themselves into the rebuilding of their country. Less familiar is the story of the Kabyles of Algeria and the bard-activist Ferhat Mehenni, who is one of their better-known leaders.
Read more

Sunday, June 21, 2009

Iran and the US -- and the Problem of Afghanistan

Iran and US through Afghanistan

Bahman Aghai Diba, PhD International Law - Persian Journal
Iranian.ws

Iran sees its cooperation in the Afghanistan exactly contrary to the US view. This means, Iran is not interested in helping the West solve its problems in Afghanistan and then go to other problems. It sees the cooperation in Afghanistan as something that comes at the end. When other problems of the USA and Iran are solved, then Iran may help the USA in Afghanistan as an advantage or a concession to the US.

The US Administration, under President Obama, in a major shift in U.S. policy, declared that the United States wanted to invite Iran to a conference on the future of Afghanistan, which was held at the end of March 2009. Iran's government spokesman, Elham, responded that the Islamic Republic would consider such a request, (1) and later Iran actually took part in it. At the same time, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki said the United States came to Afghanistan aiming to root out extremism, restore security and fight the drugs trade."All indicators in regard to these three areas show that the conditions have deteriorated sharply," he told state television. (2)

However, two things were obvious in Mr. Elham's remarks: First, the US and the West (NATO), were in "need" of help in Afghanistan. Second: They have "asked" Iran for help and Iran was going to consider the possible help because: "it was ready to help Afghanistan as it battles a growing Taliban insurgency".

While Iran and the United States sat at the same table to discuss Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, the Bush administration later called Iran as a member of the Axis of Evil.

Iranian regime felt betrayed. Instead of getting some of the "spoil" in return for its services in war, it was made target of more criticisms. This was a source that put the government of Iran in attack from inside. The extremists that had asked the government not to cooperate in Afghan issues were made bolder and they took the American position in Afghanistan vis a vis Iran as a proof that were right. They ask what are the guarantees that we do not get the same response after helping the Americans in Afghanistan?

Iran and the US both want:

1- The Taliban out of power in Afghanistan and disconnected with Pakistan
2- The stability of state in Afghanistan ( Iran is more concerned about areas close to Iran)
3- The control on narcotic drugs (Iran and US both want this but for their own reasons. Both of them are consumption centers, but Iran is also a transit route. US is worried the drugs get the money for Taliban and Al-Qaida and other terrorists)
4- They both do fear from Sunni terrorism headed by Al-Qaida.

At the same time, they have conflicts

1- The US does not wish to see the dominance of Iran in Afghanistan
2- The US is afraid of Shiite terrorism (3)
3- Iran does not want to see the American or Western plans succeed anywhere.
4- The Iranian regime hates to see the growth of democratic institutions in Afghanistan
5- Iranian regime does not want Afghanistan to be used as a base for Western (US) military operations against Iran.
6- Iran is more afraid of the USA than Taliban.

Kayhan Newspaper, close to the Supreme Leader, in an article (under the title of: "NATO's begging of Iran along with arrogance!") has mentioned: "In a move to take distance from their previous positions based on ignoring the influence of Iran in Afghanistan, the Europe and the USA have been forced to invite Iran to the gathering of the G-8 in the same field, while NATO and the USA confess that they are close to total defeat in Afghanistan and they see Iran as the only way to escape however, the Foreign Minister of Italy has said: this is an opportunity for Iran to get out of isolation (!)." (4)

Also, Aleddin Borojerdi, the Chairman of National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Majles have said: "Iran is against stabilization of the presence of [foreign] forces in Afghanistan, the experience in Afghanistan has proved that presence of foreign forces would lead to the deterioration of extremism and terrorism in that region." (5)

A review of these points leavers no doubt about the different ways of Iran and the US in looking at the problems in Afghanistan. Iran and USA have not the same time lines for cooperation in Afghanistan.

In fact what happened in the actual meeting on Afghanistan, indicated to the same fact. Iran not only did not take any step that could be interpreted as cooperating with the USA, but it avoided to let this event be a stage in the developments in the relations of Iran and US through Afghanistan.

There was something of a controversy between Iran and the U.S. regarding whether or not the delegations of the two states met at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague (31 March 2009).
The VOA reported: "Senior U.S. and Iranian leaders met Tuesday on the sidelines of an international conference in the Hague aimed at re-energizing international commitments for war-torn Afghanistan. Participants agreed to boost security and development in the central Asian nation.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the meeting that took place between U.S. special representative Richard Holbrooke and Iran's deputy foreign minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh as brief but cordial. She said the two sides had agreed to stay in touch." (6)

According to a semi-official news agency in Iran, Mehr, the spokesman for the ministry of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran denied any meeting, official or otherwise, between the representatives of Iran and the U.S. in and around the Hague conference.(7)

Shahrzad news reports that Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen claimed on a television talk show that the night before the conference he met the U.S. representative, and Holbrooke expressed an inclination to meet the Iranian representative unofficially. Therefore, Verhagen as the host arranged for the two to sit at the same table during lunch. (8)

Whatever its nature may have been, the two sides had some kind of contact. Based on the exact words of the Iranian side and whatever they may have meant, however, it may be equally possible to say no "contact" between Holbrooke and Akhundadeh took place. For instance, an employee of the Iranian diplomatic mission in The Hague who was not a member of the Iranian delegation to the conference may have represented the Iranian side.

What did Akhundzadeh, the Iranian representative have to say? According to a report on Zamaneh, a Persian web site sponsored by Radio Holland, "The point that the other side is trying to convey that this [i.e. the meeting] occurred, for whatever reason, perhaps indicates to a certain extent that they are in a hurry, or they want to exploit this in a certain way." (9) The fact that each side persists in interpreting this "contact" in its own way (the U.S. calling it a promising move and Iran calling it "nothing") has certain meanings quite independent of the nature of that contact:

1- The U.S. side is eager, perhaps even overeager to elicit a response from the Iranian side towards establishment of bilateral relations.
2- The U.S. expects much from Iran in response to the Nowruz message of President Obama to Iran.
3- Disregarding other possibilities, the U.S. has interpreted Khamenei's response to President Obama as keeping the door open for negotiation and simply looking for a face-saving way.
4- The U.S. is ignoring indications that Khamenei's response was an attempt to throw the ball back into the U.S. court. The supreme leader repeated he is waiting for the change.
5- The Iranian side did not consider its presence in the Hague conference on Afghanistan "as publicly declared time and again before the conference" as a step in the line of U.S.-Iran negotiations. In fact, the delegation criticized the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as an enhanced presence intended to find a military solution for a problem that cannot be solved militarily.

The conclusion is that Iran is not interested in the stability of Afghanistan the way the US sees it. Iran more likely prefers:

1- To see the defeat of US plans for Afghanistan as a yet another indication that the US policies do not work in the region.
2- Iran likes stability in the parts of Afghanistan near to its borders. The rest of Afghanistan is not so important. If the Taliban and Al-Qaida can create problems for the US, it is welcomed and even persuaded. As far the US relations with the regime of Iran are concerned, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
3- Iran may cooperate with the US for the preservation or continuation of "stability", but it will cost the US in other places and cases.

Notes
(1) http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5282VN20090309?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
(2) http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5282VN20090309?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
(3) http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0504/p06s02-wosc.html
(4) http://www.magiran/npview.asp?ID=1815268 ) March 2, 2009, No. 19312, P. 2
(5) http://www5.iran.ir/View/fullstory/Tools/PrintVersion/?NewsId=384684
(6) http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-31-voa45.cfm
(7) http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2009/04/085771.php
(8) http://www.shahrzadnews.org/news.php5?id=2212
(9) http://www.bitaraf.com/showlink.php?id=1053060

Bahman Aghai Diba, Washington based Iran analyst, is a former Iranian diplomat and currently a consultant to the World Resources Company

http://www.iranian.ws/iran_news/publish/article_29145.shtml
first published Apr 14, 2009

Saturday, June 6, 2009

Thinking Dangerous Thoughts . . .

. . . can get one in trouble

or can it?

This past weekend the NY based Islamic Thinkers Society crashed the Israel Day Parade in Manhattan. Keeping with their past track record they spewed nothing but hate while calling for the destruction of Israel.

Thinkers indeed. I think I need to get a gun for the next parade.

The above from Islamic "thinkers" think it's all right to call for the re-opening of Auschwitz


COMMENT by me (Leslie White)

Free Speech for them Musulims, okay, but with what's in the White House, how long can Americans expect to enjoy Free Speech because of the First Amendment?

The administration is rapidly becoming a tyranny of czars and an unbalance of powers in the government with the Executive branch grabbing it all. With the control of the Supreme Court, he's got two thirds and can start re-interpreting the Constitution in his favor. (Who's he? The clown in power.)

COMMENT at barenakedislam:


by fred g

I can think of a few good signs myself

“Anyone who supports Obama is the enemy of America”

“Muslims are child rapists, and Obama is a muslim!”

I could list a few more, but then Id have the newly formed Obama gestapo on my doorestep murdering me for exercising my free speech righs

Comment by barenakedislam on June 7, 2009 12:29 am
Not yet, Fred, we still have free speech but who know for how long? After he shuts down talk radio he’s coming for the bloggers. Next year I’ll be sure to go to that parade and I’ll take a few Marines with me.

And from another site comes this COMMENT:

This country is under attack by people even more sinister and power hungry than Hitler was. Our war is here and now. You and other patriots like us, are the leaders that will take this country back. We have the power, the will and the numbers to do so. If we all do our part, we can rid this republic of the leeches that are killing it.

and in answer to it:

Make NO mistake America, the time is coming, we WILL have open warfare in the streets and fields of this nation, it’s only a matter of time, and sooner or later, we will fight here and win, or we will lose and AMERICA will die!

Foregoing two Comments from What has our *Greatest Generation* become?
June 6th, 2009 . by TexasFred
http://texasfred.net/archives/4308

Want to read more?

OK, here's something to think about:

Overture to Civil War: There's Something Happening Here . . . and it ain't good at all
When the same idea comes from unconnected sources, separated by time and the wall that stands between life and death, it's more than a coincidence.

Monday, June 1, 2009

Islamization of Europe and Policies to Prevent It

From Islamization of Europe and Policies to Prevent It
Op-Ed

No Sharia

http://www.faithfreedom.org/2009/05/31/islamization-of-europe-and-policies-to-prevent-it

[Excerpts]

Victory for European forces (A), or victory for Islam (B)

(A) A possible end result of a civil war resulting in a victory for the domestic population will be the total banishment of traditional Islam from a specific country. Widespread emigration/deportation and large scale conversion of Muslims in the country.

(B) A victory for Islam will allow all the rules of a victorious Islam to be applied. Traditional Islam will substitute for all liberal western versions of Islam that have grown in the country but still lack any real theoretical basis and a real doctrine.

Massive and nationwide expropriations, slavery of conquered women, continued slaughter of non-Christians and Christians known for opinions opposed to Islam and of moderate Muslims who initially try to protect non-Muslims, murder of minorities e g gays. A Muslim dictatorship without democracy similar to religious dictatorships in the Middle East, is established.

The sharia laws is the basis for a new constitution and the laws of the country. The institution of dhimmitude is introduced and will regulate the life of Christians and Jews. The rest of the population will slowly be eliminated. The GNP declines successively to less than 50 % of its former level, and an insignificant growth happen only during good years.

1.3. A preliminary discussion of a few phases

If the governments of a European country during the coming decades show an unwillingness to protect its European citizens from the inroads of Islamists, this attitude will sooner or later lead to violent conflicts between the traditional or new political anti-jihad forces, and the radical Islamic movement. It seems highly possible that the development phases 2-3 may last a long time in societies with strong democratic traditions, a good educational system and – from the beginning - a fairly homogenous ethnic population. The infiltration and dissemination of political Islam’s values among non-Muslims and moderate Muslims will then during a long period be carried out mainly with non-violent means. The methods of this missionary and pre-Revolutionary work during phases 2-4 show a pattern which will be analysed later. That work is often structured according to principles laid down by e g the Moslem Brotherhood for the expansion of political Islam in European countries.

This growth of Islamic influence can be counteracted by certain laws and policies.

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http://www.faithfreedom.org/2009/05/31/islamization-of-europe-and-policies-to-prevent-it